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The objective of this study is to identify factors determining a business investment strategy (i.e., 
the choice of investment commitment and form of organizational structure) in the food 
manufacturing, chemical, agricultural wholesaling and biotechnology industries. Propositions 
regarding strategic alliance theories are tested on over 400 inter-firm collaborative agreements 
using secondary data from major US and European companies for the 1994-97 period. Results 
suggest that transactions with lower technological and resource uncertainty levels are more likely 
to result in investments with a higher commitment level (i.e., acquisitions or majority equity-
based controlling investments). The investment commitment level embedded in a single business 
transaction seems to be affected not only by a goal of cost minimization, but also by strategic 
motives and firm and industry factors. 
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Introduction 
The evolution graphs of companies such as Pioneer and Syngenta presented by Fernandez-
Cornego (2004) show how the agricultural sector has experimented with and implemented a 
wide variety of business transactions/agreements. Examples of organizational structures are joint 
ventures, share purchases, partnerships, alliances, mergers and acquisitions, franchising, 
licensing agreements, minority/majority equity interest, organic growth, and more. In this paper, 
we specifically focus on four of them: minority-equity agreements, majority-equity agreements, 
acquisitions, and horizontal agreements.  
It is always hard in the management literature to establish a definition/understanding of 
organizational structure acknowledged by a majority of academics and practitioners (Stanek, 
2004). In this paper we define a minority-equity agreement as an agreement between parties with 
less than 51% control, i.e., 50% equity investment, less than 50% equity investment, licensing or 
other type of collaborative agreement. In contrast, majority-equity agreements refer to 
agreements with controlling equity of 51% of the target-firm’s capital (Hennart, 1998; Pisano, 
1991). Acquisition is defined as the complete purchase of one company by another company. 
Horizontal agreements refer to the formation of agreements between companies in the same 
industry sector defined by SIC code. 
These different business models can be used at several levels in the supply chain: research and 
development (R&D), supply, manufacturing, and commercialization. Business models at the 
R&D level are created to brainstorm new ideas, and/or develop new products, services, or 
technologies. Agreements at the supply level are used to secure supplies. Companies can also 
make choices of organizational structures to manufacture and commercialize the new products, 
services, or technologies. 3 
 
The creation of these various organizational structures is motivated by diverse considerations 
such as risk mitigation and management; economies of scale and scope; access to resources and 
capabilities; and market positioning and strategy, e.g., competitive preempting (Stanek, 2004; 
Hagedoorn, 1993).  
In short, firm executives must make critical organizational structure decisions. Assuming a 
particular technological project has the potential for high profits and competitive advantage, 
corporate managers need to decide on a business investment strategy, i.e., how much to invest 
and which governance structure to pursue. There are two main questions related to governance 
structure that this paper addresses. 
Question 1: What are the factors determining the commitment level embedded in an 
individual business investment transaction? 
We focus here on the study of three such alternatives: minority-equity agreements, majority-
equity agreements, and acquisitions. We further limit our studies to four types of business 
agreements: R&D, supply agreement, manufacturing agreement, and commercialization 
agreement. 
Question 2: Why do firms establish horizontal inter-firm agreements?  
Our focus here is on agreements between firms in the same industry. As earlier, we further limit 
our study to four types of business agreements: R&D, supply agreement, manufacturing 
agreement, and commercialization agreement. 
The paper contains the following sections. The first section presents a description of reasons 
behind organizational structure choices, the propositions being tested in this paper, and relevant 
findings in the literature. In the following section, a presentation of the data and variables is 4 
 
proposed. The penultimate section presents the results. Finally, main conclusions and 
implications are highlighted. 
 
Theoretical and Empirical Evidence 
Two important questions that management scholars have attempted to address are why 
companies cooperate in their efforts to innovate, and what determines the nature and boundaries 
of a new relationship and the level of commitment to that relationship (Hagedoorn, 1993; 
Harrigan, 1988; Kogut et al., 1992; Kreiner and Schultz, 1993). Before discussing the reasons 
behind those choices, it is fair to note the risk of opportunism associated with agreements 
between two parties who are often competitors. Opportunism (poaching of good employees, use 
of private information or trade secrets, and more) arises because actions that have efficiency 
consequences are not freely observable. Therefore, the firm taking those actions may choose to 
pursue its private interest at the expense of other firms (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Pisano 
(1989) and Pena (1999) suggest that for transactions with little or no risk of opportunism, 
involved parties can use simple market contracts as an agreement form. As the risk increases, 
monitoring becomes necessary and can be done through intermediate governance forms such as 
minority-equity or majority-equity agreements. For situations with high risk of information 
leakage, monitoring costs may be too high, making acquisition the only solution. This argument 
leads to the first proposition that will be tested in this paper. 
Proposition 1: The higher the risk of opportunism entailed within a transaction (other 
factors being constant), the more likely the choice of an an acquisition transaction 
(Pena, 1999). 5 
 
While there is risk of opportunism associated with a low committing organizational structure 
such as a minority-equity agreement, there are still a number of reasons for companies to make 
the decision to collaborate.  Agricultural companies often face risk associated with R&D (Dwyer 
and Sivadas, 2000; Hagedoon, 1993), development and commercialization of products, and 
procurement of supplies and raw materials. One can classify uncertainty sources into three 
groups: technological uncertainty, extrinsic uncertainty, and resource uncertainty (McGrath and 
MacMillan, 1998). Technological uncertainty comes from the lack of knowledge about the 
viability of a technological project. The firm does not know whether or not the technology can be 
developed, and even less, whether or not it can reach the market. Technological uncertainty will 
be reduced once the project is undertaken. For highly uncertain technological projects, lower 
sunk costs would be preferred to higher sunk costs by risk adverse agents. McGrath and 
MacMillan (2000) propose the collaboration of firms through various organizational structures 
with different commitment levels. They suggest an inverse relationship between uncertainty and 
a hierarchical governance form. Namely, as uncertainty increases, less committing transactional 
arrangements will be preferred
1 (Pisano, 1989; McGrath and MacMillan, 2000), which brings us 
to the second proposition :  
Proposition 2: The higher the technological uncertainty associated with an agreement 
(other factors being constant), the lower the degree of investment commitment 
embedded in the transaction (Pena, 1999). 
Extrinsic uncertainty comes from forces external to a firm. Such exogenous factors may include 
unexpected government regulations, unpredictable climatic conditions, disease or product/food 
contamination, customers’ financial problems, and the general business climate. In contrast to 
                                                            
1 In this study, a minority-equity agreement is the least committing organizational structure, 
equity agreement is a more committing agreement, and business acquisition is assumed to be the 
most committing business investment transaction. 6 
 
technological uncertainty, undertaking investment in the project cannot reduce extrinsic 
uncertainty. For a risk adverse agent, higher extrinsic uncertainty will be associated with lower 
investment commitment (Long and Ravenscraft, 1993), which is proposition three. 
Proposition 3: The higher the extrinsic uncertainty associated with an agreement (other 
factors being constant), the lower the degree of investment commitment embedded 
in the transaction (Pena, 1999). 
 Resource uncertainty arises from asymmetric information about the adequacy of the resources 
owned by the potential partner. One way to reduce resource uncertainty is by developing a long-
term relationship with a partner where investment in the technological project is completed 
gradually (Kogut, 1994). As common knowledge about each partner’s capabilities is gained over 
time, a firm is in a better position to commit further in the investment project. Once resource 
uncertainty is reduced, a firm may decide to culminate the prior relationship by completing an 
acquisition of the partner firm, which brings us to proposition four. 
Proposition 4: The higher the resource uncertainty associated with an agreement (other 
factors being constant), the lower the degree of investment commitment embedded 
in the transaction (Pena, 1999). 
Risk is not the only reason behind organizational structure choices.  Access to markets, 
resources, and capabilities may also be motivators behind an agreement (Cavusgil et al., 1997; 
Oh, 1996). For example, firms may not possess in-house knowledge of the local or global 
markets, making some form of a relationship a learning opportunity (Stanek, 2004). Furthermore, 
with innovations being extremely costly, sharing costs of R&D may be desirable (Doz et al., 
1989). Access to resources can also come in the form of cross-fertilization of scientific 
disciplines, complementary technology, intellectual property rights, people skills, use of the right 7 
 
inputs, quality issues, and expansion of a product line (Insinga and Werle, 2000; Pena, 1999). In 
a competitive environment, access to complementary resources may shorten the period between 
product invention and market introduction (Pena, 1999). 
A firm may also be interested in completing a particular transaction motivated by a strategic goal 
(e.g., preemption, market power and more). Competitive preemption consists of a firm forming 
alliances to block a competitor from forming similar ones, or to discourage a competitor from 
entering a market (Stanek, 2004). This can be particularly true in concentrated industries, where 
leading firms are clearly more motivated to preserve market power and are better endowed with 
resources to follow this type of strategy than competitors (Hitt et al., 1998). This type of 
preemption strategy requires a higher degree of investment commitment in order to gain 
majority-equity control of the partner company, and most importantly, of its valued assets. It 
would be more likely to be implemented by leading firms in concentrated industries. 
Horizontal mergers and acquisitions could be an example of capturing a larger portion of the 
market in order to gain market power and leverage economies of scale and scope (Pena, 1999). A 
firm may wish to join efforts with another company in the same industry (i.e., horizontal inter-
firm agreement) and create a new entity either to reduce costs through synergy effects, or to 
improve bargaining power through increasing industry concentration. The trend towards a higher 
industry concentration in the agricultural sectors may encourage firms inclined to enhance 
market share to further pursue inter-firm horizontal alliances (Hitt et al., 1998), which results in 
propositions 5a and 5b.  
Proposition 5a: The more concentrated the industry of the dominant firm (other factors 
being constant), the higher the degree of investment commitment embedded in the 
transaction (Pena, 1999). 8 
 
Proposition 5b: As concentration of the industry of the dominant firm increases (other 
factors being constant), so does the likelihood of a transaction between firms in the 
same industry (Pena, 1999). 
Empirical evidence from studies of other industries provides support for these propositions. 
Osborn and Baughn (1990) studied 153 new alliances from 1984 to 1986 between US and 
Japanese companies in several industries. The purpose of the study was to test the effect of 
technological factors and size on choices of two collaborative relationships: joint venture (new 
entity with shared equity) and contractual agreements (do not involve shared equity). They found 
that a joint venture type of agreement was most likely when the purpose of the alliance was to 
pursue R&D activities, the technological intensity of the product was high, and the size of the 
parent firm was not large. Shan (1990) studied 278 start-up biotechnology firms and found that 
firm size is negatively correlated with the use of collaborative arrangements. He further found 
evidence that collaborative arrangements are predominantly used by high-tech, start-up firms in 
commercializing their new products in foreign markets. Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) 
used data on semiconductor firms to test both social and strategic explanations for alliance 
formation. They found that alliances form when firms are facing strategic risks or are led by 
large, experienced, and well-connected top management teams.  Using data on 2647 strategic 
alliances formed over the period of 1993–2002 by 43 major biopharmaceutical firms in the U.S. 
and Europe, Zhang et al. (2007) found that the firm's knowledge breadth and the centrality of its 
R&D organization structure positively influence its propensity to form strategic alliances. 
In our study, we also focus on factors determining organizational structure choices, for three 
types of structure (minority-equity agreements, majority-equity agreements, and acquisitions) 
that differ not only from a legal standpoint but also at a commitment level.  We test the effects of 9 
 
industry (such as different SIC codes, concentration ratio), firm (such as age, size), past 
behavior, and project types (R&D, supply, manufacturing and commercialization) on this choice. 
Furthermore, we focus on a subject, to our knowledge, often forgotten: horizontal inter-firm 
agreement (agreement between firms in the same industry) choices. To our knowledge, this is 
one of the rare studies that looks at the food manufacturing, chemical, agricultural wholesaling 
and biotechnology industries. 
 
Data and Methodology 
Secondary data are used to test the propositions presented earlier. All the companies studied are 
public and completed at least one business investment transaction (acquisition, equity agreement, 
or licensing agreement) during the 1994-97 period in order to acquire, develop, or commercialize 
food manufacturing, chemical, agricultural wholesaling and biotechnology technologies. For this 
paper, we focus our attention on major US and European companies developing new 
technologies in the food manufacturing, chemical, agricultural wholesaling and biotechnology 
industries which encompass the following three-digit SIC codes: 200, 286, 287, 519, and 873 
(Pena, 1999). 
The 1994-97 period was chosen for several reasons. First, this period follows major changes in 
food manufacturing, chemical, agricultural wholesaling and biotechnology that completely 
redefined the sector. Indeed, during the 1980s, government regulation played a decisive role in 
addressing environmental and food safety issues which led to dramatic increases for firms in 
research and development expenditures in these areas as well as increased technological, 
extrinsic, and resource uncertainty. Second, this period was marked by many business 
acquisitions, divestitures, and strategic partnerships particularly related to agricultural chemicals. 10 
 
Third, the science of biology with its role in reshaping the food and fiber industry was in its early 
stages. Fourth, a new era seems to have emerged at the end of the twentieth century and the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, with an increased focus on the seed and genetics industry 
(Shimoda, 1996). 
 The diverse sources consulted for collecting the data are: Merger and Acquisitions, Bioscan, US 
Patent and Trademark Library database, Agricultural Statistics, Statistical Abstract and 
individual companies’ annual reports. A list of business investment transactions (such as 
licensing agreement, purchase of equity or acquisition) and their characteristics (such as date, 
type of transaction, and name of the parties involved) was created using both Merger and 
Acquisitions and the Bioscan databases. The Patent and Trademark Library database was used to 
obtain information regarding patents. The sources Agricultural Statistics and Statistical Abstract 
were used to compile industry information. Annual reports were used to gather firm level 
information of the parties involved in the agreements. 
The first question of this paper (What are the factors determining the commitment level 
embedded in an individual business investment transaction?) is addressed by conducting a 
statistical test to better understand which forces contribute most in differentiating among three 
levels of investment commitment for individual business transactions [i.e., 1) minority-equity 
investment, 2) majority-equity agreements, and 3) acquisition]. Using a discriminant analysis 
technique, a sample of 467 business investment transactions completed by agribusiness 
companies was examined. 
The second question addressed in this study (Why do firms establish horizontal inter-firm 
agreements?) is focused on the formation of horizontal inter-organizational agreements, i.e., 
agreements between two or more firms in the same industry. This question is analyzed by using a 11 
 
logistic regression model on a sample of 467 business investment transactions. This model is 
designed to test specifically whether industry concentration influences the use of horizontal 
agreements. The dependent variable is whether or not the parties involved in a business 
investment transaction network are from the same industry (as evidenced by belonging to the 
same SIC industry code at the three-digit level).  
Variables used in the analyses for question 1 concerning the level of investment commitment in a 
transaction and question 2 concerning horizontal commitments are presented in Tables 1 and 2 
respectively. Each variable is explicitly defined in these tables along with the proposition being 
tested, the rationale for inclusion as an explanatory or control variable, and the hypothesized sign 
where appropriate. 
 
Discussion of Results 
Before initiating the discriminant analysis, a correlation test was conducted among the 
explanatory variables to check for multicollinearity. The Pearson correlation test showed that the 
variables were not significantly related, and consequently, all the explanatory variables were 
included in the analytical models. 
 
Business Investment Commitment 
In response to question 1, the variables that contribute most in differentiating the three levels of 
investment commitment (i.e., minority-equity, majority-equity, and acquisition) are shown in 
Table 3 along with the respective values of the coefficients that optimize the discriminant 
function. The discriminant function accounts for 86 percent of the between group (i.e., level of 
investment commitment) variability. Mean values and standard deviations for all the variables 12 
 
included in the model were computed for each group as shown in Table 3. In general, results 
show that the mean values for the significant variables vary considerably from group to group. 
The significant variables separating the three groups are SIC286, SIC519, DEBTRAT, TOTA, 
CPAP94, EXPAC, MD, and DD. The variables represent industry effects (organic chemical, 
agricultural wholesaling), acquirer’s characteristics (financial situation, firm size, research and 
learning skills gained in the past, and experience in business acquisitions), and the type of 
agreement (manufacturing, commercialization).  
As expected, acquisitions are the most popular form of agreement in the agricultural wholesaling 
industry (variable SIC519). A plausible explanation is that the agricultural wholesaling sector is 
more mature than industries such as ag-biotechnology. Companies in this industry do not face 
high extrinsic uncertainty like the biotechnology sector, where regulation about new products is 
not fully developed, markets are more volatile, and rivals’ strategic moves are unpredictable. 
While acquisitions are also popular in the organic chemical industry sector (variable SIC286), 
probably because of the maturity of this industry as well, companies in this sector primarily 
adopt investment strategies based on majority-equity agreements. The larger coefficients 
compared to SIC519 suggest there is probably more risk associated with this sector than with the 
agricultural wholesaling sector, creating the need to share risks while evolving to stay 
competitive. One may suspect the higher coefficient for majority-equity-based agreements is 
justified by an exploratory investment conduct by which firms want to share risk while having 
some control over new technologies.  
In the case of acquisitions, the financial condition of the acquirer (variable DEBTRAT) is not as 
strong compared to those companies that pursue less aggressive investment strategies; on 
average, the debt to asset ratio of acquirers is over 50%. Surprisingly, largest firms (variable 13 
 
TOTA) are the ones involved in majority-equity agreements. This may be related to the results 
for the variable DEBTRAT suggesting that because companies involved in acquisitions are more 
highly leveraged, they are not involved in as many acquisitions that require larger capital 
commitments.  
The results for the variable CPAC94 suggest that companies involved in majority-equity 
agreements are better endowed with research and learning skills. Prior to 1994, these companies 
held a larger number of patents relative to firms pursuing minority-equity or acquisition 
agreements. The explanation for this phenomenon may be twofold. First, most of their patents 
may come from past agreements suggesting that they have learned from the past and 
consequently are now better able to select the right partners and more accurately assess the 
uncertainty. Second, because they have more patents, they can attract partners and are in no need 
to make an acquisition to obtain the needed resources. As expected, results show that a firm’s 
greater experience in completing business acquisitions (variable EXPAC) increases the 
likelihood of pursuing a new business acquisition. 
Results suggest that acquisition agreements are more common in manufacturing (variable MD) 
and commercialization (variable DD) activities. Uncertainty involved in this type of transaction 
is lower than in R&D agreements; therefore, high commitment business investments are made. 
Indeed, rather than showing an exploratory behavior (i.e., assessment of new technologies), the 
parties seem to exploit their respective technological capabilities in a common front (e.g., a new 
operating system of established plants or new management of distribution channels).  
 
Business Investment Form 14 
 
The second question assesses the factors influencing the formation of horizontal inter-firm 
relationships. Table 4 shows the results for the logistic regression analysis of why firms establish 
horizontal agreements or network as reflected by being in the same industry measured by the SIC 
code. Comparing the predictions to the observed outcomes, one can observe that the model 
correctly classifies 74% of the agreements. Of the horizontal alliances included in the sample, 
69% were classified correctly. 
Nine variables representing transaction, firm and industry characteristics are of special 
importance in explaining the formation of horizontal agreements between firms operating in the 
food manufacturing, chemical, agricultural wholesaling and biotechnology industries markets. 
Eight of these variables are highly significant (i.e., a significance level of .05 or greater). The 
Exp(β) values represent the factor by which the odds (not the probability) change when the i
th 
explanatory variable increases by one unit. For instance, if βi is positive, the factor will be greater 
than 1, which means that the odds for a horizontal agreement are increased. If βi is negative, the 
factor will be less than 1, which means that the odds are decreased. When βi is 0, the factor will 
equal 1, which leaves the odds unchanged. 
Horizontal inter-firm relationships appear to be less likely in industries showing large variance in 
sales (variable DV); the sales variance is a measure of risk in the industry. One would have 
thought that more risk in an industry would be a motivator for companies in the same industry to 
ally to share the risk. However, sales variance may hide the fact that some companies (the 
leaders) may be extremely successful at maintaining a stable level of sales while others (the 
followers) are extremely unsuccessful. Leaders are unlikely to ally with each other because they 
have enough resources on their own and may fear leakage of private information while followers 
do not represent appealing partners. 15 
 
Horizontal inter-firm relationships appear to be more likely in industries showing higher 
concentration ratios (variable SICR4), which supports proposition 5b. Follower firms may decide 
to collaborate with other industry companies to reach the competitive position achieved by 
industry leaders as suggested by the positive sign of the variable SICR4. Alternatively, leading 
firms may also decide to collaborate with other industry companies to enhance their competitive 
position, to achieve scale economies, to strengthen their bargaining power, or to support the 
market leadership of a particular technology. Regardless of the type (i.e., leaders or followers) 
and motive of companies (i.e., efficiency, market power, or technology) to pursue horizontal 
agreements, what seems obvious is that firms still continue to respond to the consolidation 
process initiated in many agricultural sectors at the end of the last decade. 
Horizontal agreements seem to be less likely in agricultural wholesaling (variable SIC519) or 
agricultural biotechnology (variable SIC873) sectors. Different arguments may exist to explain 
this relationship. For agricultural wholesaling companies, it might be more interesting to pursue 
vertical agreements (e.g., product supply agreements), rather than horizontal agreements, in order 
to secure the delivery of products from manufacturing companies. As for biotechnology 
companies, such companies may not be willing to share proprietary knowledge with other 
biotechnology companies, since research knowledge is the main firm idiosyncratic asset and 
source of future revenues. Horizontal alliances are likely to endanger rent appropriation from 
technological projects. Agricultural biotechnology companies may also prefer vertical 
agreements to develop their innovations with manufacturing companies, because usually 
biotechnology firms lack complementary capabilities such as production facilities and operations 
management skills. 16 
 
Companies that are more heavily leveraged (variable DEBTRAT) are more likely to engage in 
horizontal agreements, probably because they don’t have the capital to buy all the needed 
resources. Horizontal agreements seem to be less likely when the dominant party has recognized 
experience in acquiring businesses (variable EXPAC). Antitrust laws may play a restrictive role 
among experienced acquirer firms in conducting further business acquisitions or other 
agreements.  
Horizontal inter-firm relationships appear to be more common for R&D (variable RD) and 
manufacturing purposes (variable MD). The logic for conducting R&D agreements among firms 
in the same sector might be to complement research skills in terms of technological knowledge. 
As suggested by the significant variable MD, advantages derived from horizontal synergy effects 
might also serve to explain manufacturing agreements. 
 
Conclusion and Implications 
Findings in our study indicate that in addition to cost and strategic specific factors, firm and 
industry factors are relevant in determining the choice of investment commitment level in a 
business exchange. Results in this paper were expected to provide insight into two important 
business investment strategy issues: 1) What are the factors determining the commitment level 
embedded in an individual business investment transaction? and 2) Why do firms establish 
horizontal inter-firm agreements?  
Propositions 1, 2, 3, and 5b are at least partially supported. Propositions 4 and 5a are not 
supported by our analysis. According to the results, acquisitions are common in mature 
industries such as the agricultural wholesaling and organic chemical industries, and the most 
common form of agreement (among the three studied) for the agricultural wholesaling industry. 17 
 
Acquirers tend to be more financially vulnerable than companies in other forms of agreement. 
While they have more assets than companies in minority-equity agreements, they have less than 
companies involved in majority-equity agreements. They also own fewer patents than companies 
involved in majority-equity agreements. As expected, results show that a firm’s greater 
experience in completing business acquisitions increases the likelihood of pursuing a new 
business acquisition. Finally, acquisitions are more common in manufacturing and 
commercialization projects, i.e., more mature projects than R&D. 
Companies pursuing majority-equity agreements portray different firm attributes. On the one 
hand, they seem to be larger as indicated by the average total asset amount. On the other hand, 
they are better endowed with research and learning skills. Prior to 1994, these companies owned 
a larger number of patents relative to firms pursuing minority-equity or acquisition agreements. 
Finally, minority-equity agreements seem to be associated with smaller firms conducting mostly 
R&D agreements, with an inferior competitive advantage regarding research and technological 
learning skills, and almost no experience in pursuing business acquisitions. Apparently, these are 
firms that lack the pool of tangible and intangible assets owned by firms classified in the rest of 
the groups. The risk to which they seem to be exposed appears to be higher relative to other 
firms (i.e., higher technological and resource uncertainty), and it is not surprising to notice a low 
investment commitment in their business transactions. 
Horizontal agreements seem to be less common for the agricultural wholesaling and ag-
biotechnology industries, but more common in highly concentrated industries with low 
variability in sales. They are usually for sharing R&D and manufacturing capabilities. 
Companies with high levels of debt and less experience with acquisitions are more likely to be 
involved in this type of agreement. 18 
 
This study provides several implications for how corporate managers may plan and implement 
their business investment projects. The first implication for corporate managers is that the choice 
of an optimum business investment strategy (i.e., investment commitment and form of 
investment) for a business transaction depends not only on minimizing transaction costs, but also 
on strategic objectives (e.g., exploration of new technologies and partners; exploitation of 
technological rents through market power; preemption; expansion towards new industry 
segments through business conglomerates; etc.).  
Corporate managers competing in the food manufacturing, chemical, agricultural wholesaling 
and biotechnology markets should expect an acquisition-type of transaction to be more likely to 
occur when the exchange involves a manufacturing or commercialization agreement as opposed 
to a R&D or supply agreement. The acquisition investment outcome is also more likely when the 
acquirer has been operating for a long period in the industry and has experience and resources for 
acquiring companies. Managers should expect that industries where little extrinsic uncertainty 
prevails, like the mature food wholesaling sector, are very appropriate to complete business 
acquisitions. Advantages from synergy effects or strategic positioning in a consolidating industry 
may be reasons to explain such an investment behavior.  
This study also offers some implications for policy makers. Our work suggests that most 
horizontal agreements in food manufacturing, chemical, agricultural wholesaling and 
biotechnology markets are equity-based agreements instead of business acquisitions. How these 
non-acquisition linkages will be treated by antitrust authorities is unclear. The propensity 
towards business acquisitions seems to be higher in concentrated industries. Regarding 
concentration and antitrust issues, the results suggest that government authorities should be less 
concerned with unstable industry sectors (i.e., industries with higher uncertainty such as 19 
 
agricultural biotechnology) and more concerned with more stable industries (such as the 
agricultural wholesaling sector). 
Results of this study should be interpreted with caution. Findings were derived from a reduced 
sample. Furthermore, the study sample represented a specific period of time, 1994-97. A larger 
sample with more companies and an extended time framework would improve the reliability of 
the results. Several avenues are suggested for further work for research scholars. In addition to 
the commitment and form of investment, it would be interesting to examine the timing of the 
investment. Some companies seem to prefer to invest earlier to benefit from first-mover 
advantages, whereas other firms prefer to wait-and-see how industry competition evolves before 
making any investment commitment. Analyzing the investment time dimension may shed further 
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d
 
w
i
t
h
 
R
&
D
 
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
 
(
C
o
h
e
n
 
a
n
d
 
L
e
v
i
n
t
h
a
l
,
 
1
9
9
0
)
.
 
E
X
P
A
C
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
 
a
c
q
u
i
s
i
t
i
o
n
s
 
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
d
o
m
i
n
a
n
t
 
p
a
r
t
y
 
b
e
f
o
r
e
 
e
a
c
h
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
t
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
1
9
9
4
-
1
9
9
7
 
t
i
m
e
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
.
 
1
 
F
i
r
m
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
h
a
v
e
 
e
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
c
q
u
i
s
i
t
i
o
n
s
 
m
a
y
 
b
e
 
b
i
a
s
e
d
 
t
o
w
a
r
d
s
 
a
c
q
u
i
s
i
t
i
o
n
s
.
 
R
E
L
D
I
V
 
D
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
a
k
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
1
 
i
f
 
a
 
f
i
r
m
 
p
o
s
s
e
s
s
e
s
 
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
 
(
i
.
e
.
,
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
 
b
e
i
n
g
 
s
o
l
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
e
 
S
I
C
 
c
o
d
e
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
)
,
 
0
 
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
 
1
,
 
4
 
F
i
r
m
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
 
a
r
e
 
m
o
r
e
 
v
u
l
n
e
r
a
b
l
e
 
t
o
 
l
e
a
k
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
m
a
y
 
h
a
v
e
 
e
n
o
u
g
h
 
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
 
t
o
 
n
o
t
 
s
e
e
k
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
s
 
(
S
h
a
n
,
 
1
9
9
0
)
.
 
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
T
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
/
A
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
 
 
D
D
 
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
 
2
 
L
o
w
 
u
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
t
y
 
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
i
s
 
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
;
 
e
a
s
y
 
t
o
 
p
i
n
p
o
i
n
t
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
c
k
i
n
g
 
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
a
c
q
u
i
r
e
 
t
h
e
m
 
(
K
o
g
u
t
,
 
1
9
8
8
)
.
 
M
D
 
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
 
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
 
2
 
L
o
w
 
u
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
t
y
 
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
i
s
 
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
;
 
e
a
s
y
 
t
o
 
p
i
n
p
o
i
n
t
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
c
k
i
n
g
 
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
a
c
q
u
i
r
e
 
t
h
e
m
 
(
K
o
g
u
t
,
 
1
9
8
8
)
.
 
S
D
 
(
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
o
r
 
c
o
m
m
o
d
i
t
y
)
 
s
u
p
p
l
y
 
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
 
2
 
L
o
w
 
u
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
t
y
 
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
i
s
 
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
;
 
e
a
s
y
 
t
o
 
p
i
n
p
o
i
n
t
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
c
k
i
n
g
 
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
a
c
q
u
i
r
e
 
t
h
e
m
 
(
K
o
g
u
t
,
 
1
9
8
8
)
.
 2
7
 
 
R
D
 
R
&
D
 
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
 
2
 
R
&
D
 
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
 
a
r
e
 
h
i
g
h
l
y
 
u
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
;
 
n
o
t
 
e
a
s
y
 
t
o
 
p
i
n
p
o
i
n
t
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
c
k
i
n
g
 
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
a
c
q
u
i
r
e
 
t
h
e
m
 
(
K
o
g
u
t
,
 
1
9
8
8
)
.
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
 
S
I
M
 
D
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
a
k
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
1
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
 
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
t
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
/
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
e
 
S
I
C
 
c
o
d
e
s
;
 
0
 
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
 
4
 
A
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
i
m
i
l
a
r
i
t
y
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
s
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
,
 
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
 
u
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
t
y
 
i
s
 
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
d
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
(
H
i
t
t
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
1
9
9
8
;
 
S
a
m
p
s
o
n
,
 
2
0
0
7
)
.
 
 2
8
 
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
2
.
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
E
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
 
S
i
g
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
H
o
r
i
z
o
n
t
a
l
 
A
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
N
a
m
e
 
D
e
f
i
n
i
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
P
r
o
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
b
e
i
n
g
 
t
e
s
t
e
d
 
E
x
p
l
a
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
E
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
 
s
i
g
n
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
C
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
D
o
m
i
n
a
n
t
 
F
i
r
m
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
T
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
/
A
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
 
D
V
 
V
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
 
i
n
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
s
a
l
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
1
9
9
4
-
9
7
 
t
i
m
e
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
S
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
r
i
s
k
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
m
a
y
 
b
e
 
s
h
a
r
e
d
.
 
+
 
S
I
C
R
4
 
T
h
e
 
f
o
u
r
-
f
i
r
m
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
c
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
 
5
b
 
A
 
m
o
r
e
 
c
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
e
d
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
m
a
y
 
e
n
c
o
u
r
a
g
e
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
t
o
 
e
n
h
a
n
c
e
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
(
H
i
t
t
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
1
9
9
8
)
.
 
+
 
S
I
C
2
0
0
 
D
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
a
k
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
1
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
 
d
o
m
i
n
a
n
t
 
f
i
r
m
 
b
e
a
r
s
 
t
h
e
 
S
I
C
 
c
o
d
e
 
2
0
0
 
-
f
o
o
d
 
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
;
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
0
 
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
F
o
o
d
 
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
 
h
a
s
 
l
i
m
i
t
e
d
 
p
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
 
f
o
r
 
p
r
o
p
r
i
e
t
a
r
y
 
k
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
;
 
f
e
w
 
r
i
s
k
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
r
e
 
o
u
t
w
e
i
g
h
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
 
o
f
 
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
f
i
r
m
s
.
 
+
 
S
I
C
2
8
6
 
D
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
a
k
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
1
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
 
d
o
m
i
n
a
n
t
 
f
i
r
m
 
b
e
a
r
s
 
t
h
e
 
S
I
C
 
c
o
d
e
 
2
8
6
 
-
o
r
g
a
n
i
c
 
c
h
e
m
i
c
a
l
s
;
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
0
 
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
O
r
g
a
n
i
c
 
c
h
e
m
i
c
a
l
s
 
i
s
 
a
 
m
a
t
u
r
e
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
w
i
t
h
 
l
i
m
i
t
e
d
 
p
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
 
f
o
r
 
p
r
o
p
r
i
e
t
a
r
y
 
k
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
;
 
f
e
w
 
r
i
s
k
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
r
e
 
o
u
t
w
e
i
g
h
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
 
o
f
 
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
f
i
r
m
s
.
 
+
 
S
I
C
5
1
9
 
D
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
a
k
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
1
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
 
d
o
m
i
n
a
n
t
 
f
i
r
m
 
b
e
a
r
s
 
t
h
e
 
S
I
C
 
c
o
d
e
 
5
1
9
 
-
a
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
a
l
 
w
h
o
l
e
s
a
l
i
n
g
;
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
0
 
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
A
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
a
l
 
w
h
o
l
e
s
a
l
i
n
g
 
h
a
s
 
l
i
m
i
t
e
d
 
p
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
 
f
o
r
 
p
r
o
p
r
i
e
t
a
r
y
 
k
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
;
 
f
e
w
 
r
i
s
k
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
r
e
 
o
u
t
w
e
i
g
h
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
 
o
f
 
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
f
i
r
m
s
.
 
+
 
S
I
C
8
7
3
 
D
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
a
k
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
1
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
 
d
o
m
i
n
a
n
t
 
f
i
r
m
 
b
e
a
r
s
 
t
h
e
 
S
I
C
 
c
o
d
e
 
8
7
3
 
-
a
g
-
b
i
o
t
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
y
;
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
0
 
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
A
g
-
b
i
o
t
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
y
 
i
s
 
a
 
g
r
o
w
i
n
g
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
w
i
t
h
 
s
u
b
s
t
a
n
t
i
a
l
 
r
i
s
k
 
a
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
l
e
a
k
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
h
a
t
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
o
u
t
w
e
i
g
h
 
t
h
e
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
 
o
f
 
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
s
.
 
+
 
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
C
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
D
o
m
i
n
a
n
t
 
F
i
r
m
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
T
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
/
A
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
 
 2
9
 
 
D
E
B
T
R
A
T
 
R
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
l
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
o
v
e
r
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
D
o
m
i
n
a
n
t
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
h
i
g
h
 
d
e
b
t
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
c
a
n
n
o
t
 
a
f
f
o
r
d
 
t
o
 
a
c
q
u
i
r
e
 
a
l
l
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
e
d
 
t
o
 
a
l
l
y
.
 
+
 
I
N
T
L
S
A
L
E
 
R
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
s
a
l
e
s
 
t
o
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
 
o
v
e
r
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
s
a
l
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
y
e
a
r
 
1
9
9
7
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
F
i
r
m
s
 
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
d
 
i
n
 
m
a
n
y
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
 
w
i
l
l
 
h
a
v
e
 
m
o
r
e
 
d
i
f
f
i
c
u
l
t
y
 
f
i
n
d
i
n
g
 
a
 
c
o
m
p
a
t
i
b
l
e
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
.
 
-
 
T
O
T
A
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
 
i
n
 
1
9
9
7
 
(
i
n
 
t
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
 
U
S
 
d
o
l
l
a
r
s
)
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
D
o
m
i
n
a
n
t
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
 
l
a
r
g
e
 
a
s
s
e
t
 
b
a
s
e
 
m
a
y
 
n
o
t
 
h
a
v
e
 
t
h
e
 
n
e
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
a
l
l
i
e
s
 
e
x
c
e
p
t
 
a
c
q
u
i
r
i
n
g
 
c
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
.
 
-
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
C
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
D
o
m
i
n
a
n
t
 
F
i
r
m
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
T
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
/
A
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
 
 
A
G
E
 
A
g
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
d
o
m
i
n
a
n
t
 
f
i
r
m
 
i
n
 
1
9
9
7
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
O
l
d
e
r
 
f
i
r
m
 
m
a
y
 
b
e
 
m
o
r
e
 
w
e
l
l
-
k
n
o
w
n
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
r
e
f
o
r
e
 
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
 
f
e
w
e
r
 
r
i
s
k
s
;
 
m
a
k
e
s
 
t
h
e
m
 
a
 
m
o
r
e
 
a
p
p
e
a
l
i
n
g
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
.
 
+
 
C
P
A
L
L
N
C
 
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
t
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
d
o
m
i
n
a
n
t
 
f
i
r
m
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
t
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
c
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